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Prior to the 2004 enlargement of the European Union the older Member States (the EU15) voiced 
concerns that labour market disruption and benefit tourism would occur upon extension of the 
right to free movement to nationals of the eight central and eastern European accession countries 
(the EU8).  Consequently, the Treaty of Accession 2003 included transitional arrangements 
enabling the EU15 to derogate from the acquis on the free movement of workers for a maximum 
period of seven years.1  Most recently, following the enlargement which took place in 2007, an 
analogous regime has been imposed on nationals of Bulgaria and Romania (the EU2).2
 
The concern of this paper is to take a closer look at the relationship between the nationals of the 
recently-acceded central and eastern European (CEE) Member States and the evolving status of 
Union citizenship.3  As the free movement of persons provisions, which extend valuable mobility 
rights and contingent social entitlement to EU citizens, constitute a central, if not the central, facet 
of Union citizenship, one of the main objectives of the paper is to explore the impact of restricted 
mobility rights during the transitional period(s) on the citizenship status of nationals from the CEE 
Member States. 
 
First, attention turns to the notion of Union citizenship itself and the significance of free movement 
to a meaningful interaction with the status is emphasised.  In the second part of the paper the 
contention that EU8 and EU2 nationals have been granted a ‘second-class’ citizenship status is 
explored in further detail.  Certainly, transitional restrictions impact on the traditionally privileged 
category of economic migrant workers who, undoubtedly, occupy a less-privileged status during 
                                                 
1 Treaty of Accession 2003 [2003] O.J. L 236/17.  Article 24, Act of Accession [2003] O.J. L236/33 refers to a series of 
Annexes that contain details of the transitional arrangements in respect of each accession Member State (Annexes 
V-XIV).  For example in relation to Poland see Annex XII [2003] O.J. L236/875  
2 Treaty of Accession 2005 [2005] O.J. L157/11.  In the case of the EU2 it is the EU25 (not EU15) that is entitled to 
derogate from the acquis on free movement of workers 
3 The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia (the ‘EU8’); Bulgaria and 
Romania (the ‘EU2’)  
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the transitional period.    The typical typology of free movement entitlement under Community law 
is examined (i.e. that applicable to EU15 nationals and to nationals of Cyprus and Malta), and 
then the newest CEE citizens are incorporated into the citizenship hierarchy.  Part three then 
considers the opportunities for EU8 and EU2 nationals to rely on the broader, non-economic right 
to free movement as a citizen flowing from Article 18 EC as, despite the imposition of transitional 
arrangements on the free movement rights of workers, CEE citizens are entitled to migrate 
throughout the EU under the sponsorship of one of the other categories of citizenship status.  In 
examining the links between EU8 and EU2 nationals and the different sites of free movement in 
the EC Treaty there is also scope to trace the development of Union citizenship from a 
predominantly market-based status (attaching only to those ‘worthy’ economic migrants 
connected to the functioning of the Internal Market) to an arguably more inclusive and social 
conception of citizenship. The latter understanding of citizenship provides scope for economically 
inactive migrants to gain a degree of access to the status of citizenship and the valuable rights 
that append to it.  Although it must be recognised that the non-economic mobility rights are clearly 
of value to some CEE citizens, the paper argues that the denial of the (complete) right to move as 
a worker continues to be a significant loss to the overall citizenship package extended to EU8 and 
EU2 nationals.4          
 
1. Union citizenship as a concept and its link to mobility 
Citizenship in a broad sense, although it remains somewhat of a contested concept,5 refers to 
membership and participation in a community;6 additionally, it denotes both entitlements and 
responsibilities which attach to the citizens who belong to the said community (usually the nation-
state).7  Citizenship then, formally, is a legal status but ‘in its fullest sense it is the culmination of 
incorporation into a society’.8  Bellamy has identified rights, participation and solidarity as the key 
                                                 
4 This paper aims to analyse the citizenship status of CEE migrants at the EU, as opposed to the national, level.  
Nevertheless, it is recognised that the national context also plays a prominent role in shaping the rights and 
experiences of post-accession migrants as a consequence of the degree of discretion Member States are able to 
exercise when implementing transitional arrangements.  For discussion of the UK approach to EU8 migrants see 
Currie, S., ‘‘Free’ movers? The Post-Accession Experience of Accession-8 Migrant Workers in the UK’, (2006) 31 
European Law Review, 207; Currie, S., 'De-Skilled and Devalued: The Labour Market Experience of Polish Migrants 
in the UK Following EU Enlargement’, (2007) 23 (1) International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations, 83-116  
5 Faist, T., ‘Social Citizenship in the European Union: Nested Membership’, (2001) 39(1) Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 37, 40 
6 Marshall, T.H., Citizenship and Social Class, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950) 
7 Kofman, E., ‘Citizenship for Some but not for Others: Spaces of Citizenship in Contemporary Europe’, (1995) 14(2) 
Political Geography, 121, 122 
8 Ibid. 
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components of contemporary citizenship.9  More specifically it is civil rights, particularly those that 
protect individual autonomy and family life; the right to engage in the political process; and to 
access social rights, such as education and social assistance, that are most crucial to an 
understanding of modern citizenship in its broad sense.  This understanding, of course, has been 
established predominantly in the context of national citizenship.   The notion of Union 
citizenship,10 which has its own distinctive features, complements (rather than replaces) national 
citizenship11 and is formally articulated in Articles 17-22 EC after a chapter on citizenship was 
agreed and inserted into the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.12  The formal creation of the citizenship 
provisions was part of an aspiration to increase the legitimacy of the European project and to 
further the integration of EU nationals living in Member States other than their own.13  Essentially, 
the policy concern, of the European Commission in particular, was to bring ‘Europe closer to its 
citizens’.14         
 
Article 17 EC clarifies who is able to access the status of citizenship of the Union.  Perhaps it is 
more appropriate to say this provision makes clear that it is the individual Member States that 
determine which individuals gain access to the status as ‘every person holding the nationality of a 
Member State shall be a citizen of the Union’.  This demonstrates the exclusionary nature of 
Union citizenship as for the many third-country nationals resident in EU Member States it has 
been an unattainable status and a community within which they have not been able to attain full 
membership or participation.  By its very nature citizenship lays down boundaries between those 
who are included and those who are excluded.15  One issue this paper seeks to explore is 
whether EU8 and EU2 nationals, despite now being nationals of a Member State, remain 
excluded from full membership and participation within the EU community.   
 
                                                 
9 Bellamy, R., ‘Introduction: The Making of Modern Citizenship’ in Bellamy, R. et al (Eds.), Lineages of European 
Citizenship: Rights, Belonging and Participation in Eleven Nation States, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 1, 
6  
10 See Shaw, J., ‘The Many Pasts and Futures of Citizenship in the European Union’, (1997) European Law Review, 
554; Shaw, J., ‘The Interpretation of European Union Citizenship’, (1998) 61(3) Modern Law Review, 293 
11 Article 17(2) EC 
12 For more detail on the background behind the inclusion of citizenship see O’Leary, S., The Evolving Concept of 
Community Citizenship (The Hague: Kluwer, 1996); also, the Tindermans Report on the European Union, produced 
at the request of the Paris summit in 1974, included a chapter entitled ‘Towards a Europe for Citizens’ (Bull.EC.(8) 
1975 II no.12, 1)  
13 Chalmers, D., Hadjiemmanul, C., Monti, G. and Tomkins, A., European Union Law Text and Materials (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 566-568; Ackers, L. and Dwyer, P., Senior Citizenship? Retirement, Migration 
and Welfare in the European Union, (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2002), 16-18 
14 Ackers and Dwyer, Ibid., 17.  It is outside the scope of this paper to give a detailed overview of the history of Union 
citizenship but see O’Leary, Op. Cit. n.12; Wiener, A., ‘European’ Citizenship Practice: Building Institutions of a Non-
state, (Boulder: Westview, 1998) 
15 Kofman, Op. Cit. n.7, 121 
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The citizens’ rights established in the ‘citizenship chapter’ agreed at Maastricht include, in Article 
18 EC, the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the 
limitations and conditions laid down by the Treaty and the measures adopted to give it effect.   
There is also the right to vote in local and European elections in the host state (Article 19 EC);16 
the right to diplomatic and consular protection from the authorities of any Member State in third 
countries (Article 20 EC); and the right to petition the European Parliament and the right to apply 
to the ombudsman in any one of the official languages of the EU (Article 21 EC).  This 
constitutionalisation of the notion of Union citizenship clearly resonates with the notion of free 
movement as the applicable rights, notwithstanding Article 18 EC itself, are exercisable only 
outside of the citizen’s home state.17  In addition, Shaw makes the point that the formalisation of 
Union citizenship at Maastricht: 
 
‘was essentially the beginning of a new stage in an on-going process of development of the 
status of the individual under Community law which had involved inputs from the Court of Justice, 
and especially its constitutionalisation of the free movement provisions and the right to non-
discrimination on the grounds of nationality…’18   
 
Citizenship, therefore, stretches further than the articulation in Articles 17-22 EC to incorporate 
also the traditional ‘economic’ free movement provisions,19 read alongside the extensive 
interpretation provided by the ECJ of the social rights of economic migrants. It also finds 
expression via the equal treatment principle in Article 12 EC and various pieces of secondary 
legislation.20     
 
Union citizenship thus bestows a series of political, civil and socio-economic rights, which in some 
respects resembles the national citizenship model, but there can be no doubt that free movement 
is the trigger for any meaningful relationship with Union citizenship.  Ackers and Dwyer stress that 
not only is mobility a right that citizens can access in itself, it also constitutes the trigger to other 
                                                 
16 It is not the intention here to discuss aspects of political citizenship. See Lardy, H., ‘The Political Rights of Union 
Citizenship’, (1997) European Public Law, 111; Shaw, J., ‘Sovereignty at the Boundaries of the Polity’ in Walker, N. 
(Ed.), Sovereignty in Transition, (Oxford Hart, 2003), 461; Shaw, J. and Smith, M., 'Changing Polities and Electoral 
Rights: Lithuania's accession to the EU' in Shah, P and Minski, W. (Eds), Migration, Diasporas and Legal Systems in 
Europe, (London: Routledge, 2006), 145 
17 The Court has confirmed that the citizenship provisions are not applicable in wholly internal situation, see Cases 
64/96 and 65/96 Uecker and Jacquet [1997] E.C.R. I-3171 
18 Shaw, J., ‘The Many Pasts and Futures of Citizenship in the European Union’, (1997) 22(6) European Law Review, 
554 
19 Articles 39, 43 and 49 EC 
20 Now most notably Directive 2004/38 [2004] O.J. L158/77, and Regulation 1612/68 [1968] O.J. L257/2 
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forms of social entitlement, a ‘basket of goods’, that come into play while that right is being 
exercised,21 most notably welfare and family rights.22  They go on to make the point that the 
development of citizenship has, essentially, taken place alongside the evolution of mobility rights: 
 
‘In the absence of mobility, citizenship of the Union contributes little to the social status and day-
to-day experience of Community nationals’.23
 
It is this interrelationship between rights of mobility and citizenship that demands some discussion 
of the extent to which the transitional arrangements, by limiting the ability of EU8 and EU2 
nationals to rely on Article 39 EC and move as workers, effectively excludes them from full 
access to the status of Union citizenship.   
 
Union citizenship, with its reliance on free movement as a central trigger to entitlement, as 
opposed to a primary reliance on political rights,24 appears to have quite different characteristics 
to the kind of national citizenship described above with reference to Bellamy’s classification of 
rights, participation and solidarity.25  However, the free movement provisions have provided a 
fertile site for the development and extension of social rights seen as necessary to facilitate the 
movement and establishment of migrant workers.26  Similarly, the more recent caselaw 
interpreting Article 18 EC in conjunction with Article 12 EC has enabled welfare entitlement to be 
extended to non-worker migrants under certain conditions.27  In this respect there is at least a 
modicum of ‘solidarity’ evident in the developing citizenship caselaw.  Indeed, authors have 
drawn a link between the recent emphasis on a ‘social Europe’ and Marshall’s seminal work on 
citizenship which highlighted the development of social rights as the maturity of a relationship 
between the state and the people.28  There is then, it seems, a degree of social citizenship29 
                                                 
21 Ackers and Dwyer, Op. Cit. n.13, 3 
22 For example workers’ rights of family reunification under Directive 2004/38, or entitlement to social benefits 
pursuant to Article 7(2), Regulation 1612/68   
23 Ackers and Dwyer, Op. Cit. n.13, 3 
24 Everson, M., ‘The Legacy of the Market Citizen’ in Shaw, J. and More, G. (Eds.), The New Legal Dynamics of 
European Union, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 73, 74 
25 Although Articles 19-21 EC do provide some ‘civil’ rights and rights of political participation for those citizens in a 
Member State other than their own   
26 Pursuant to the non-discrimination principle enshrined in Article 39 EC (and Article 12 EC) and expressed in 
specific provisions of the secondary legislation such as Article 7(2), Regulation 1612/68 (and ensuing caselaw), Case 
207/78 Even [1979] E.C.R. 2019; Case 32/75 Fiorini v SNCF [1975] E.C.R. 1085; Case 65/81 Reina [1982] E.C.R. I-
33; Case 59/85 Netherlands v Reed [1986] E.C.R. 1283 
27 Discussed below.  See, for example, Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala [1998] E.C.R. I-2691; Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk 
[2001] E.C.R. I-6193 
28 For example, Shaw, Op. Cit. n.18; Ackers and Dwyer, Op. Cit. n.13, 16 
29 On social citizenship see, Everson, Op. Cit. n.24 
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evident in the evolving or maturing arena of Union citizenship.  This paper will touch upon the 
extent to which social solidarity under the auspices of free movement is, or may possibly be, 
extended to EU8 and EU2 migrants. Citizenship, therefore, in the context of this is measured in 
terms of the residence rights extended to migrants and the consequent ability to rely on the 
principle of non-discrimination in the host state in order to access various social rights and 
benefits.30  
 
2. Second class citizenship for EU8 and EU2 nationals in light of transitional restrictions 
on free movement?  
Many of the discussions, particularly those surrounding the 2004 enlargement, were couched in 
quite symbolic terms referring to the post-communist CEE countries’ ‘return’ to their rightful place 
in Europe.31  This literature portrays the extension of free movement rights as holding particular 
significance for the citizens of the CEE Member States on account of the specific historical and 
socio-political background of the respective countries; specifically, under communism citizens of 
the CEE countries were subject to mobility restrictions, even between regions within a single 
state.32  For example, prior to enlargement, in 2002, Maas argued that: 
 
‘For individual citizens in the candidate accession countries, freedom of movement is without a 
doubt a key symbol of the ‘return to Europe’ that EU accession represents.  Citizens of applicant 
Member States regard the freedom of movement that EU citizens enjoy as remarkable when 
contrasted with the limits to movement they experienced under communism’.33    
 
Given the symbolic importance of free movement, and the significance of mobility to citizenship, it 
is not surprising that the consequent failure to extend the right of free movement in full has led 
some to comment that EU8 and EU2 nationals are, initially at least, relegated to a status of 
                                                 
30 Enshrined in Article 12 EC.  Note that here the terms ‘non-discrimination’ and ‘equal treatment’ are used 
interchangeably to refer to the principle in Article 12 EC.  The author acknowledges the point that, in practice, the right 
of individuals not to be discriminated against may not necessarily result in them being treated on an equal footing with 
nationals but there is insufficient scope in this paper to consider this in any depth.  See the literature on the 
‘substantive versus formal equality’ debate including, inter alia, Barnard, C. and Hepple, B., ‘Substantive Equality’, 
(2000) 59 Cambridge Law Journal, 562; Fredman, S., ‘Equality: A New Generation?’, (2001) 30(2) Industrial Law 
Journal, 145.  On the notions of equal treatment and non-discrimination in EU law see Numhauser-Henning, A. (Ed.), 
Legal Perspectives on Equal Treatment and Non-Discrimination, (The Hague: Kluwer, 2001)  
31 Kengerlinsky, M., ‘Restrictions in EU Immigration Policies towards New Member States’, (2004) 2(4) Journal of 
European Affairs, 12; Maas, W., ‘Free Movement and EU Enlargement’, Paper prepared for the Fifth Biennial 
Conference of the European Community Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, 31 May-1 June 2002  
32 Petev, V., ‘Citizenship and Raison D’État. The Quest for Identity in Central and Eastern Europe’ in La Torre, M. 
(Ed.), European Citizenship: An Institutional Challenge, (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998), 83; Maas, Ibid 
33 Maas, Op. Cit. n.31, 2 
  - 6 - European Union Studies Association Conference, 17-19 May 2007, Montreal 
second class Union citizenship.34  Reich, for example, comments that a seven-year 
postponement of free movement rights does not conform to the ‘spirit of creating a greater 
Europe after the fall of the Soviet regime’.35   
 
The transitional arrangements on the free movement of persons allow EU15 Member States to 
derogate from Articles 1-6 of Regulation 1612/6836 in respect of EU8 and EU2 nationals.37  It is 
these provisions which enable nationals of the Member States to access the labour markets of 
the other Member States and, hence, these provisions are the main source of an EU migrant 
worker’s mobility and employment rights.  By permitting the old Member States to deny labour 
market access to EU8 and EU2 nationals the transitional restrictions have the effect of rendering 
the Community law status of ‘worker’ inapplicable to the vast majority of the new EU citizens.  
Those who qualify as a worker38 enjoy extensive citizenship rights in the form of secure residence 
in the host society39 and, furthermore, contingent social rights such as family and welfare 
entitlement.40  The extensive nature of migrant workers’ citizenship standing under Community 
law is illustrated further by the ability of the status to have continuing effects after the employment 
relationship has come to an end.  The recently-adopted Directive on the free movement rights of 
citizens and their family members (Directive 2004/38),41 for example, now makes clear that the 
status of worker, which includes the right to reside and the attached social rights, continues to 
apply in the aftermath of a worker being made (involuntarily) unemployed, not being able to work 
due to illness or an accident, or embarking on vocational training.42  This contrasts with the less 
                                                 
34 Maas, Op. Cit. n.31; Carrera, S., ‘What Does Free Movement Mean in Theory and Practice in an Enlarged EU?’, 
(2005) 11(6) European Law Journal, 699  
35 Reich, N., ‘The European Constitution and New Member Countries: The Constitutional Relevance of Free 
Movement and Citizenship’, Paper presented at the Centre for European, Comparative and International Law’s 
Annual Lecture, University of Sheffield, 26 February 2004, 16 
36 [1968] O.J. L257/2 
37 Note that in the case of the EU2 it is the EU25 which have the opportunity to apply mobility restrictions.  As a result 
of the Treaty of Accession concerning Romania and Bulgaria some of the EU8 Member States will be in the position 
of applying transitional measures against the new(er) citizens while their own nationals’ free movement rights remain 
curtailed.           
38 Pursuant to the test laid down in cases such as Case 66/85 Lawrie Blum [1986] E.C.R. 2121 of ‘for a certain period 
of time performing services for and under the direction of another person in return for which remuneration is received’ 
39 Pursuant to Article 39 EC.  Previously Directive 68/360 [1968] O.J. L257/13 articulated the procedural requirements 
connected to the right to reside, now Directive 2004/38 contains the relevant rules. 
40 Op. Cit. n.30.  Family members have also been extended rights of residence and equal treatment in the host 
Member State. Directive 2004/38 now articulates this, previously it was realised by Regulation 1612/68 and the 
caselaw of the ECJ, for example see Cases 32/75 Fiorini v SNCF [1975] E.C.R. 1085; C-278/94 Commission v 
Belgium [1996] E.C.R. I-4307; C-185/96 Commission v Greece [1998] I-6601 
41 [2004] O.J. L158/77 
42 Article 7(3), Directive 2004/38.  The provision enshrines the decision in Case 39/86 Lair [1988] E.C.R. 3161 so that 
in cases of voluntarily unemployment, were the migrant has enrolled on a vocational course, the training should be 
related to the previous employment.  Note that a provision in the Accession Treaties allows the older Member States 
to withdraw the rights of EU8 and EU2 nationals who become voluntarily unemployed during the transitional period: 
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secure situation of those migrants who move without any ‘economic’ link, discussed below, 
whose rights of residence are much more circumscribed.   
 
Before the discussion examines the impact of the transitional arrangements on the citizenship 
status of EU8 and EU2 nationals, the following subsection details the ‘usual’ typology of free 
movement entitlement that applies to the different categories EU migrant citizen.    
 
2.1 Differentiated rights for Union citizens  
Community law bestows different citizenship ‘packages’ on different categories of migrant citizens 
and, given the Union’s economic origins, this has conventionally been determined by the 
particular category’s degree of connection to the functioning of the Internal Market.  Thus, the 
traditional approach to citizenship attaches primacy to the relationship between the individual and 
the labour market.43   
 
Workers usually stand at the summit of the citizenship hierarchy alongside those other citizens, 
the self-employed and those providing services, also exercising one of the Community’s 
fundamental freedoms.44  Also at the summit are those retired citizens exercising their right to 
remain in a Member State where they have worked.45  Citizenship, as mentioned earlier, is 
usually thought of as conferring rights and duties.  One way of interpreting the traditionally 
privileged status of market citizens is to view their economic activity as, essentially, a duty fulfilled.  
Under this analysis, it is their economic contribution to the host Member State that has granted 
them the right to claim the various social entitlements including access to the extensive non-
discrimination principle.46  However, the very ‘absolute’ nature of the worker status which 
emerges from the ECJ’s caselaw undermines this understanding somewhat.  The ECJ has 
adopted an extremely broad understanding of who will constitute a worker so that those who 
receive wages lower than the official subsistence level in a Member State,47 or, those who require 
additional public funds to supplement their wages48 still acquire the very privileged status despite 
                                                                                                                                            
Article 24 of the Act of Accession [2003] O.J. L236/33, para. 2, Annexes.  It is not entirely clear how the provisions 
relate but, in the event of an EU8 or EU2 migrant worker leaving a job to take up a vocational course, the Member 
State may attempt to rely on the Accession Treaty during the transitional period to expel the migrant. 
43 Ackers and Dwyer, Op. Cit. n.13, 13 
44 It is not the intention here to consider the exercise of establishment or the provision of services in any detail 
45 Pursuant to Regulation 1251/70 [1970] O.J. Sp. Ed. L143/24 
46 Although, as will be demonstrated, more recent developments in the citizenship law has led to those without such 
economic ‘value’ gaining access to the principle of equal treatment  
47 Case 53/81 Levin [1982] E.C.R. 1035 
48 Case 139/85 Kempf [1986] E.C.R. 1741 
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the contribution they make, in economic terms, being limited in nature.  If a worker is classified as 
undertaking effective and genuine work their residence and equal treatment entitlement is 
(almost) unconditional in nature.49       
 
Arguably, the family members of the market citizens described above have occupied the next 
rung down the ladder.  Despite the derivative nature of family members’ status it has been a far-
reaching one thanks often to the ECJ’s interpretation of secondary legislation which extended the 
worker’s package of entitlement also to the family under the facilitating mobility test.50  Directive 
2004/38 has also solidified somewhat the status of family members by explicitly extending the 
right of equal treatment to them.51          
 
Under the economic paradigm the bottom rung has been reserved for those with little, or any, 
connection to the Internal Market.  This includes retired persons who exercise mobility rights after 
ending their occupational life in their own Member State (and thus have no ‘right to remain’ in any 
host Member State), students and the financially independent.  The rights of these economically 
inactive citizens are dealt with in more detail below in relation to the status of EU8 and EU2 non-
workers; suffice it to say for now that the status is much less secure than that of the market-
citizen worker.  In particular, their rights of residence have been subject to the twin requirements 
of possessing sufficient resources so as not to become a burden on the public assistance of the 
host Member State and of having taken out a policy of sickness insurance in the host state for 
themselves and their family.52  The equal treatment rights of such citizens have also been more 
heavily circumscribed.  In relation to students, for example, in Brown it was decided that, at that 
stage in the development of Community law, there was no anti-discrimination protection available 
in the area of maintenance or training grants.53  Article 3 of Directive 93/96 confirmed this 
position.  However, as will be demonstrated later, the ECJ was able to interpret the provisions of 
Community law to enhance the equal treatment rights of students (and other non-economically 
                                                 
49 Subject to the, strictly defined, derogations on the grounds of public policy, public security and public health now 
detailed in Article 27-33, Directive 2004/38; previously the position was dealt with under Directive 64/221 [1964] O.J. 
Sp. Ed. L850/64   
50 For example, Case 207/78 Even [1979] E.C.R. 2019 
51 Article 24, Directive 2004/38 
52 Retired persons: previously Directive 90/365 [1990] O.J. L180/28; Students: previously Directive 93/96 [1993] O.J. 
L317/59; Financially-independent persons: previously Directive 90/364 [1990] O.J. L180/26. Now the free movement 
rights of all citizens are set out in Directive 2004/38 
53 Case 197/86 Brown [1988] E.C.R. 3205 
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active citizens) following the introduction of Article 18 EC.54  For our purposes here it is sufficient 
to note that such non-market citizens are accorded a less comprehensive status than workers.         
 
One final group of migrants to be situated in the hierarchy are workseekers.  Community law has 
traditionally regarded workseekers as semi-workers (or semi-market citizens).  The Court has 
held that if Member State nationals could only move for purposes of accepting offers of 
employment, then the free movement of workers would be significantly hindered.55  EU nationals 
have, therefore, been afforded the right to move freely to other Member States and reside there 
for the purpose of seeking employment.  The Court in Antonissen further secured the position of 
workseekers by stating that they should be granted a reasonable period in which to find work56 
and that, as long as the workseeker could show he or she was continuing to seek employment 
and had genuine chances of being engaged, the right of residence could continue.57  Thus the 
residence status of workseekers appears relatively secure and one could argue that they sit just 
beneath workers on the citizenship ladder, especially given that they enjoy a (future) connection 
to the labour market.  The equal treatment rights of this group, however, seem to more mirror 
those sitting at the bottom of the ladder.  In effect, as with students, the approach of the ECJ was 
initially restrictive, holding that workseekers’ rights of equal treatment only applied to accessing 
employment and not to any ‘social advantages’.58  Again, the Court’s jurisprudence on the 
cumulative impact of Articles 18 and 12 EC has enabled workseekers to enjoy greater access to 
the non-discrimination principle thus enhancing their citizenship status.59  However, the current 
status of this group (along with that of students) is complicated by the provisions of Directive 
2004/38 which attempts to deny equal treatment as regards social assistance to workseekers 
(and as regards maintenance grants for students).60  In some respects, then, for the time being 
the position of workseekers is slightly unclear as it is difficult to predict how the Court will interpret 
the provisions of Directive 2004/38.  For now we will place them tentatively at the midway point, 
just beneath the family members of the market citizens as, although their status as regards the 
right to non-discrimination is ambivalent, their right to reside whilst genuinely seeking work is 
secure and not subject to the resources requirement.       
                                                 
54 For example, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] E.C.R. I-6193; Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] E.C.R. I-2119 
55 Case C-292/89 Antonissen [1991] E.C.R. I-745 
56 6 months was suggested as a reasonable period of grace, Antonissen, para 21 
57 Directive 2004/38, on the whole, confirms this position.  Although the general right of residence applies for only 3 
months (Article 6) it is made clear in Article 14(4)(b) that a Union citizen cannot be expelled so long as they are 
continuing to seek employment and have genuine chances of being engaged  
58 Case 316/85 Lebon [1987] E.C.R. 2811 
59 Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] E.C.R. I-2703 
60 Article 24(2), Directive 2004/38 
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2.2. Adding EU8 and EU2 nationals to the citizenship hierarchy 
As a result of the transitional arrangements on free movement EU8 and EU2 migrants experience 
a different kind of citizenship status and an altered, somewhat more complex, hierarchy 
emerges.61  What the transitional restrictions do, essentially, is hamper the capacity of nationals 
from the CEE Member States to migrate under the sponsorship of one of the traditional 
‘economic’ Community provisions – Article 39 EC.  Articles 43 and 49 EC continue to apply so 
that EU8 and EU2 nationals are free to move throughout the EU to establish a business or to 
provide (or receive) services62 but there can be no doubt that the denial of worker status dents 
the citizenship status of EU8 and EU2 nationals; certainly, it reduces their potential to be market 
citizens.   
 
The place of workers, as a category of free movers, is relegated on the citizenship scale during 
the transitional period.  Furthermore, due to the particular design of the transitional arrangements 
workers do not have a uniform entitlement to residence across the EU Member States.  As it is for 
individual EU15 Member States to determine whether or not they restrict labour market access, 
the citizenship status of EU8 and EU2 nationals differs between Member States (in actual fact, in 
the case of the EU2 the individual EU25 Member States can decide whether to impose 
restrictions or not).      
 
One consequence of the transitional arrangement’s focus on workers as a category of migrant is 
to enhance the importance of the distinction between workers and the self-employed.  There may 
be a ‘grey zone’63 in some instances as to whether the work being carried out is under the 
direction of another, and hence is in the capacity of an employee, or is carried out independently 
and is thus is carried out as a self-employed person.64  In any event, those CEE nationals who do 
exercise a right to establishment (or provide services) are entitled to take their place at the top of 
the hierarchy.65  Those EU8 or EU2 workers called upon by certain of the older Member States to 
                                                 
61 See Stalford, H., ‘The Impact of Enlargement on Free Movement: A Critique of Transitional Periods’, Paper 
presented at the Third Meeting of the UACES Study Group on the Evolving EU Migration Law and Policy, University 
of Liverpool, 5 December 2003 
62 Although, Austria and Germany are entitled to apply national measures to address serious disturbances or the 
threat thereof, in specific sensitive sectors of their labour market, see para. 13, Annexes 
63 Adinolfi, A., ‘Free Movement and Access to Work of Citizens of the New Member States: The Transitional 
Measures’, (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review, 469, 490 
64 See, inter alia, Case C-268/99, Aldona Malgorzata Jany [2001] E.C.R. I-8615 
65 Although it does need to be acknowledged that the position of service providers (and recipients), as non-residents, 
is not completely analogous to that of resident workers and self-employed persons.  See Van Der Mei, A.P., Free 
Movement of Persons Within the European Community: Cross Border Access to Public Benefits, (Oxford: Hart, 2003)  
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fill gaps in their labour markets - such as the UK, Ireland and Sweden – and those who gain 
access to other of the EU Member States on an individual basis do (for example by means of 
obtaining a work permit), in theory at least, sit at the top of the ladder as once access is secured 
the principle of non-discrimination as regards social advantages66 applies in full under the 
transitional arrangements.67  However, the reality of such workers’ experience may be quite 
different, as the UK’s stance under the transitional arrangements demonstrates.  The UK 
attempts to limit the citizenship status of EU8 and EU2 workers by denying rights of residence 
and equal treatment should the employment relationship come to an end which, as was 
mentioned earlier, is a privilege extended to migrant workers under Community law.   
 
EU8 and EU2 migrant students, retired persons and economically self-sufficient individuals enjoy 
access to a higher position in the hierarchy than do workers not required by the EU15 because 
the transitional mobility restrictions do not apply to these groups.  This clearly demonstrates the 
reversal of citizenship fortune experienced by workers during the transitional periods who, 
essentially, are downgraded to the bottom of the hierarchy.68  As a corollary of the worker’s 
demotion the family members of such citizens also occupy a less-privileged status during the 
transitional periods.  Indeed, the status of family members is downgraded to an even greater 
extent under the Accession Treaties as the transitional arrangements enable the implementing 
Member States to prevent family members from working for a period of 18 months or until three 
years after the date of accession (whichever date is earliest),69 whereas the standard Community 
law position is for family members to enjoy immediate labour market access.70
 
CEE workseekers similarly occupy a lower citizenship status than their EU15 counterparts.   
Interestingly, however, residence rights of workseekers flow directly from Article 39 EC itself 
rather than from the secondary legislation.71  Arguably then, workseekers’ residence rights fall 
outside the scope of the permitted derogations in the Accession Treaties, the main focus of which 
                                                 
66 Article 7(2), Regulation 1612/68 [1968] O.J. L257/2 
67 Note, however, the continuing application of the safeguard clause which enables the EU15 to resort to transitional 
measures at any point during the transitional period (Act of Accession [2003] O.J. L236/33; para. 7, Annexes).  It is 
unlikely, however, that the invocation of this safeguard would sanction the expulsion of those that had already gained 
access to the status of worker in the territory 
68 Stalford, Op. Cit. n.61, 10 
69 Para. 8, Annexes 
70 Article 23, Directive 2004/38; previously Article 11, Regulation 1612/68 
71 Case C-292/89 Antonissen [1991] E.C.R. I-745, para. 13 
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is Articles 1-6 Regulation 1612/68 not Article 39 EC itself.72  This interpretation seems to be 
shared by the Commission as its free movement guide, produced to provide information about 
the operation of the transitional arrangements, states: 
 
‘Discrimination is prevented at the job search stage… Indeed all job-seekers are entitled to 
search for work in other Member States’.73   
 
On this reasoning it may be appropriate to suggest that EU8 and EU2 migrants do formally have 
a right to reside under Community law to seek work for a reasonable period.  Admittedly, this 
argument may appear unconvincing when one considers that the majority of EU15 Member 
States appear to circumvent Article 39 EC in this manner by denying residence to workseekers.  
But presumably, in an EU15 Member State with transitional restrictions in place a CEE migrant 
would have no reasonable prospects of becoming engaged and the right to reside would expire.74   
Essentially, the very existence of such transitional restrictions renders it unlikely that an EU8 or 
EU2 workseeker would have genuine chances of finding employment;75 hence, workseekers sit 
below workers in the citizenship hierarchy that emerges under the transitional arrangements.   
 
Clearly EU8 and EU2 migrants’ citizenship status is downgraded as a result of the transitional 
restrictions. Hence, they are denied full membership and participation in the community that they 
have, formally, joined and are, accordingly, not fully incorporated into the EU ‘society’ while 
restrictions are in place.  Furthermore, Stalford argues: 
 
‘The transition arrangements challenge more general, prevailing theories of citizenship which 
traditionally denote a common political, geographical, social and civil identity, implying a share in 
individual and collective rights and responsibilities’.76       
 
                                                 
72 This is discussed in more detail later on but for now it is sufficient to note that the Commission shares this view: 
European Commission (DG Enlargement), Free Movement for persons – A Practical Guide for an Enlarged European 
Union, (Brussels, 2002), 6 
73 European Commission (DG Enlargement), Free Movement for persons – A Practical Guide for an Enlarged 
European Union, (Brussels, 2002), 6 
74 Of course it also true that many EU8 migrants will purposely not seek work in a Member State that has transitional 
restrictions in place because they will not expect to be successful 
75 Note that the position of workseekers is likely to be different in those Member States that have opened their labour 
market 
76 Stalford, Op. Cit. n.61, 11 
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Of course, the transitional restrictions are temporal in nature and are not a new phenomenon.  
After all, they were imposed following the accessions of Greece, Spain and Portugal (although 
they were lifted early).  One wonders, however, whether the spirit within which the nationals of the 
CEE countries have been introduced to the EU will have any longer-term effects for the newest 
citizens’ experience and perception of Union citizenship.  Citizenship as a concept was largely 
absent from the documents surrounding the enlargement process;77 indeed, there is no mention 
of it in the transitional arrangements contained in either the 2003 or 2005 Accession Treaties.78  
This is unusual given the frequent contemporary emphasis placed on the concept of Union 
citizenship, particularly by the European Commission.   Furthermore, the rather discriminate way 
in which the restrictions are focussed on the ten post-communist states, leaving aside Malta and 
Cyprus, may be fuelling a perception of inequity in the CEE Member States.  It suggests a ‘them 
and us’ attitude on behalf of the EU15, with Malta and Cyprus perceived as being more like the 
old Member States, and thus being immediately entitled to full membership of the community, and 
the CEE Member States being viewed more suspiciously; accordingly, their nationals are 
excluded from membership and full participation in the Community.  Moreover, the specific 
symbolic significance of mobility rights to those who have experienced stringent movement 
restrictions in the past adds weight to the argument that the initial exclusion from full citizenship 
will be felt particularly keenly by many of the nationals in the CEE Member States and may be 
interpreted as a form of second class membership.   
 
One particular criticism levelled at the transitional arrangements is articulated by Maas: 
 
‘Usually, the concept of citizenship is seen as a status that is unitary; either one is a citizen or one 
is not.  That is not the way to think of citizenship in this case; the current enlargement will feature 
a gradual process of extending rights to individuals’.79  
 
Arguably, however, Maas’ construction of citizenship is firmly based on a national model and 
displays a fundamental misunderstanding of the workings of Union citizenship.  Despite the 
Court’s, and now also the legislature’s,80 insistence that citizenship is destined to be the 
fundamental status of the nationals of the Member States,81 the reality is that Union citizenship is 
                                                 
77 Stalford, Op. Cit. n.61; Maas, Op. Cit. n.31 
78 Although the relevance of Article 18 EC is discussed below 
79 Maas, Op. Cit. n.31, 15 
80 Recital 3, Preamble to Directive 2004/38 
81 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] E.C.R. I-6193, para. 31 
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highly differentiated and has never offered a unitary status.82  The hierarchy of citizenship status 
sketched above corroborates this viewpoint.  Advocate-General Léger’s vision that ‘every citizen 
of the Union must, whatever his nationality, enjoy exactly the same rights and be subject to the 
same obligations’83 has certainly not yet been realised.  As has already been pointed out here, 
the traditional distinction has been between the economically active groups of migrants ‘protected 
by the Treaty’s core provisions and long-established secondary legislation and those who fall into 
more marginal categories such as the unemployed, the disabled, tourists, students, pensioners 
and the independently wealthy’.84  Those either side of the distinction have varying degrees of 
access to the principles of free movement and equal treatment.85  The entrenchment of 
differentiated citizenship rights for all Union citizens under Community law leads Dougan to the 
conclusion that the downgraded status of EU8 and EU2 migrant workers is simply part of this 
ongoing trend: 
 
‘Even as regards nationals of the existing Member States, free movement rights vary according to 
distinctions drawn by the Treaty itself, under secondary legislation passed by the Community 
institutions, and through the caselaw of the Court – distinctions based on nationality, economic 
worth and financial status – whereby… some of the least wealthy and most vulnerable members 
of society are excluded from rights to free movement and residency across the EU’.86         
 
The restricted citizenship status of EU8 and EU2 nationals, then, simply adds to the norm of 
differentiation already inherent in Community law.87  Presumably under this analysis the new 
citizens are not accorded second class membership or, if they are, it does not amount to any 
more of a disadvantageous position than that experienced by certain groups of EU15 nationals.  
Undoubtedly it is true that the citizenship provisions, and this is particularly evidenced by the 
caselaw on Article 18 EC, appear to privilege those migrants who have, on the whole, adequate 
financial resources but have fallen on temporary difficulties in fulfilling the terms of the secondary 
                                                 
82 Fries, S. and Shaw, J., ‘Citizenship of the Union: First Steps in the European Court of Justice’, (1998) 4(4) 
European Public Law, 533; Dougan, M., ‘A Spectre is Haunting Europe… Free Movement of Persons and the 
Eastern Enlargement’ in Hillion, C. (Ed.), EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach (Oxford: Hart, 2004), 111 
83 Case C-214/94 Boukhalfa [1996] E.C.R. I-2253 
84 Fries and Shaw, Op. Cit. n.82, 535 
85 Ackers, L., Shifting Spaces: Women, Citizenship and Migration within the European Union’, (Bristol: Policy Press, 
1998), 111 
86 Dougan, Op. Cit. n.82, 141 
87 Directive 2004/38 retains the distinction between market citizens on the one hand and students, the financially 
independent and retired persons on the other 
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legislation.88  However, while the less wealthy have been largely excluded from the broader 
citizens’ right to free movement the Court’s wide construction of the worker under Article 39 EC 
has opened up the fundamental right of mobility to those wanting to move to another Member 
State in search of economic and/or personal fulfilment.  Unlike the free movement enshrined in 
Article 18 EC, residence under Article 39 EC is not subject to any ‘limitations and conditions’ and 
is not, therefore, dependant on the possession of such requirements as adequate resources and 
sickness insurance.  Consequently, this provision has been accessible to the less wealthy 
nationals of the Member States.89  With this in mind, it is arguable that the particular downgraded 
citizenship status imposed on EU8 and EU2 nationals can be distinguished from the Community 
norm of differentiated free movement rights for all as the transitional restrictions deny access to 
one of the most valuable categories of market citizen: that of migrant worker.  While it is open to 
less wealthy EU15 nationals to try to increase their economic status by exercising their right to 
mobility for the purposes of taking up work, EU8 and EU2 nationals’ ability to accomplish the 
same is significantly more restricted during the transitional periods.  Currently, the right to move 
as a worker is more of a central feature of Union citizenship, certainly it is more valuable to the 
new CEE citizens, than the broader right to move as a citizen; thus, it is difficult not to conclude 
that EU8 and EU2 nationals are subject to a second rate conception of citizenship during the 
transitional periods.  Moreover, whereas the hierarchy involving EU15 nationals has been 
predicated on the basis of each group’s perceived economic capacity and value, the post-
enlargement hierarchy relies to a greater extent on nationality as a deciding factor.  Therefore, the 
rationalisation behind the new typology of free movement is more difficult to rationalise. 
              
The discussion in the following section turns to the broader impact of the citizenship provisions, 
access to which is not restricted by the Accession Treaties, on the mobility rights of EU8 and EU2 
nationals outside the scope of the free movement of workers.  Although, in some circumstances, 
the rights flowing from Article 18 EC can be valuable for certain migrants it is not an adequate 
replacement for access to the fundamental market right enshrined in Article 39 EC.  There is no 
doubt that the ability to move to another Member State to work is an extremely valuable right 
which is often relied upon by those who wish to further their career, gain greater experience or 
perhaps provide a better standard of living for their family.  Arguably, it is this capability that would 
                                                 
88 On students see Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] E.C.R. I-6193; on the independently wealthy see Case C-413/99 
Baumbast [2002] E.C.R. I-7091.  For further detail see Dougan, M. and Spaventa, E., ‘Educating Rudy and the Non 
English Patient: A Double Bill on Residency Rights Under Article 18 EC’, (2003) 28(5) European Law Review, 699 
89 See Cases 53/81 Levin [1982] E.C.R. 1035; 139/85 Kempf [1986] E.C.R. 1741; 196/87 Steymann [1988] E.C.R. 
6159 
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be most cherished by many of the new citizens.  Therefore, although the capacity of ‘citizens’ to 
move is left intact, and despite the fact that differentiated citizenship rights are the norm in 
Community law, it would seem that the absence of the right to move as a worker is significant for 
CEE nationals’ citizenship status, and for the perception they have of their ‘worth’ in the eyes of 
the EU15.                 
 
3. The entitlement of CEE nationals as migrant citizens as opposed to migrant workers   
The current transitional arrangements adopt an approach similar to the restrictions put in place 
following the accessions of Greece (1981) and Spain and Portugal (1986) in that they permit 
Member States to discriminate on grounds of nationality as regards access to employment.  The 
focus on workers is an attempt by the EU15 to curb potential labour market flooding. In addition, 
the transitional restrictions represent a desire to avoid the situation whereby employees on low-
wages gain automatic rights to social welfare in the host Member State.90 What the recent 
Accession Treaties do not take into account is the existence of the formal citizenship provisions 
and the potential impact of the mobility rights enshrined in Article 18 EC (which extends a right to 
reside in other Member States to all citizens).  The Court’s requisite jurisprudence, which often 
applies the non-discrimination principle in Article 12 EC in conjunction with Article 18 EC, also has 
implications for the citizenship status of EU8 and EU2 migrants.91  As a result of such 
developments, which are elaborated on below, citizenship is ‘nested’92 across various sites in the 
Treaty and is therefore, at least in some form, accessible to CEE nationals in spite of the 
transitional arrangements.  Citizenship rights are no longer confined to the traditional ‘Single 
Market’ provisions, such as Article 39 EC.                    
 
At the time of the accessions of Greece, Spain and Portugal citizenship as a concept had not yet 
been constitutionalised by insertion into the Treaty.  Hence, the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 
provide the first time opportunity for the broader notion of citizenship to interact with the restricted 
status of market citizenship offered to accession migrants under the transitional arrangements.  
Despite the extension of more comprehensive free movement rights to citizens generally the 
                                                 
90 See cases Op. Cit. n.89 
91 Including Case C-85/96 Martinez Sala [1998] E.C.R. I-2691 ; Case C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] E.C.R. I-7091; Case 
C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] E.C.R. I-6193; Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] E.C.R. I-2703; Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello 
[2003] E.C.R. I-11613 
92 On the concepts of ‘nested’ and ‘multiple’ citizenships see Faist, Op. Cit. n.5; Kostakopoulou, T., Citizenship, 
Identity and Immigration in the European Union, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 66-67; 
Kostakopoulou, T., ‘Nested “Old” and “New” Citizenship in the European Union: Bringing Out the Complexity’, (1999) 
5 Columbia Journal of European Law, 389 
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transitional arrangements have persisted with the preoccupation, in line with previous 
enlargements, with workers.  Consequently, the ability of the EU15 Member States to prevent the 
migration of nationals from the newest Member States is more constrained in the aftermath of this 
enlargement than in previous EU expansions.93   
 
First in this section, attention turns to the possibility of EU8 and EU2 nationals relying upon the 
right to residency enshrined in Article 18 EC.  Secondly, there is analysis of the access to the 
principle of non-discrimination in Article 12 EC which may be extended to those found to have a 
right to reside in an EU Member State.  These entitlements constitute the two main components 
of Union citizenship extended to migrant citizens.  Although they are closely related it is helpful to 
examine them individually in order that the potential application of both citizenship components to 
the situation EU8 and EU2 nationals can be appreciated.  This approach also mirrors the logic of 
the relationship between the entitlements: once it is established that a migrant citizen is resident 
in a Member State the right to rely on the equal treatment principle in Article 12 EC becomes 
active.     
 
3.1 Rights of residence across the enlarged EU 
EU8 and EU2 nationals are entitled from the outset to access the mobility rights attached to the 
economically-inactive categories of migrant citizen, such as students and financially independent 
persons,94 described above in relation to the hierarchy of citizenship status.95  In order to present 
a complete picture of the residence rights available to EU8 and EU2 nationals under these 
groupings (and the requisite rights of equal treatment examined below) it is necessary to discuss 
both the old regime in the form of the residence Directives and their relationship with Article 18 
EC as determined in the caselaw of the Court, and, the new regime established by Directive 
2004/38.   
 
Article 18 EC confers on all citizens of the Union the right to move and reside freely within the 
Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaty and the 
                                                 
93 Farkas, O. and Rymkevitch, O., ‘Immigration and the Free Movement of Workers after Enlargement: Contrasting 
Choices’, (2004) International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 369, 373 
94 The status of retired persons is not discussed specifically here, although the rights (and obligations) of this group is 
analogous to those of financially independent persons in that the resources requirement is central to the grating of 
residence in an effort to ensure the host welfare state is not unreasonably burdened.  Note also that Directive 2004/38 
creates a category of permanent residents who, after lawful residence in a Member State for 5 years, are no longer 
subject to the resources requirement and enjoy fully the right to equal treatment: Articles 16-21  
95 In addition to the market citizen categories of self-employed person and service provider 
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measures adopted to give it effect.   It was just prior to the insertion of the citizenship provisions in 
the Treaty that the Community legislature had adopted the residency Directives which addressed 
economically-inactive migrants: Directive 90/365 (retired persons),96 Directive 93/96 (students)97 
and Directive 90/364 (those persons able to support themselves).98  Although this cluster of 
secondary legislation was intended to ‘liberate the Community from its economic preoccupation 
and to prepare the way for a community of citizens’,99 all three Directives made clear that the 
right of residence was dependant on: the possession of adequate resources not to become a 
burden on the social assistance scheme of the host Member State; and, being covered by 
sickness insurance.  Hence, the Member States were clearly concerned about the possibility of 
welfare tourism and sought to exclude from the right to reside those who would be unable to 
support themselves and their families in the host state.  In the initial period following the insertion 
of the citizenship provisions by the Treaty of Maastricht it was not entirely clear what sort of 
relationship existed between the Directives’ requirement of self-sufficiency and the ‘limitations and 
conditions’ on the right of free movement referred to in Article 18 EC.  On the one hand, there 
was the argument that Article 18 EC simply codified the existing position under Community law to 
the effect that only economically-active and economically self-sufficient citizens could access 
mobility rights.  On the other hand, there was also a sentiment expressed by some that Article 18 
EC may have disentangled the links between the right to move freely and the need to be 
economically-active/self-sufficient  to the effect that a separate right to mobility for all Union 
citizens had been created.100   
 
Although there was a period of speculation,101 the Court began to make important 
pronouncements on the effect of Article 18 EC and, in relation to the extent of the right of 
residence, Baumbast102 and Grzelczyk103 warrant particular attention and are discussed in detail 
below.104  It was in the case of Baumbast that the Court first declared the right to reside in Article 
                                                 
96 [1990] O.J. L180/28 
97 [1993] O.J. L317/59 
98 [1990] O.J. L180/26 
99 Hailbronner, K., ‘Union Citizenship and Access to Social Benefits’, (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review, 1245 
100 For more detail on the uncertainty surrounding the effect of the citizenship provisions see Fries and Shaw, Op. Cit. 
n.82 
101 See Fries and Shaw, Op. Cit. n.82, 534 
102 Case C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] E.C.R. I-7091 
103 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] E.C.R. I-6193 
104 Note that these decisions came after the important judgment in Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala [1998] E.C.R. I-2691 
which is discussed later in relation to the equal treatment rights of EU8 citizens.  The focus here is on residence 
entitlement 
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18 EC to be directly effective.105  This was despite the argument, put forward by the German and 
UK governments, that the ‘limitations and conditions’ referred to in Article 18 EC prevented the 
right from being free-standing.106  The Court confirmed that the right of residence in Article 18 EC 
was sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional and, thus, conferred a right upon individuals.107  
In  Grzelczyk  the ECJ made the, now quite celebrated, statement that ‘Union citizenship is 
destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’.108  This statement has 
now been codified in Directive 2004/38109 which would suggest the formulation has been 
embraced also by the Community’s political institutions.  Additionally, however, in both of the 
aforementioned cases the Court confirmed that the ‘limitations and conditions’ referred to in 
Article 18 EC did include the requirements of sufficient resources and sickness insurance found in 
the residence Directives.  Thus, the Court confirmed here that Article 18 EC had not completely 
detached the right to free movement from the economic elements; indeed, in Baumbast the ECJ 
stated that the limitations and conditions set out in the residence Directives recognise: 
 
‘…that the exercise of the right of residence of citizens of the Union can be subordinated to the 
legitimate interests of Member States.  In that regard, according to the fourth recital in the 
preamble to Directive 90/364 beneficiaries of the right of residence must not become an 
unreasonable burden on the public finances of the host Member State’.110         
 
Before taking a closer look at the details and impact of these judgments on the residence rights of 
EU8 and EU2 nationals the position of the law following the adoption of Directive 2004/38 needs 
to be acknowledged.  With regards to residence, the Directive retains the twin requirements of 
sufficient resources and sickness insurance in respect of economically inactive migrants.  Hence, 
the distinction between the economically active and economically viable, on the one hand, and 
the non-economically active, on the other, remains.  The Directive does, though, provide that all 
Union citizens have a right of residence for up to three months without any conditions or any 
formalities other than the requirement to hold a valid identity card or passport.111  Therefore, it is 
                                                 
105 Baumbast, para. 84 
106 Ibid., para. 78 
107 Ibid., para. 86 
108 Grzelczyk, para. 31.  This has been restated in numerous other decisions of the ECJ including, inter alia, Case C-
138/02 Collins [2004] E.C.R. I-2703 and Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] E.C.R. I-11613. 
109 Recital 3, Preamble, Directive 2004/38 [2004] O.J. L158/77 
110 Baumbast, para. 90 
111 Article 6, Directive 2004/38 
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only after this three-month period that the above distinction and the ‘limitations and conditions’ on 
the right of residence come into play.112   
 
The existence of this three-month period in the new piece of secondary legislation is interesting 
when held up against the transitional arrangements in the Accession Treaties.  Under the terms 
of the Directive EU8 and EU2 nationals, as Union citizens, are entitled to make use of this right 
that allows them to enter and reside in an EU15 Member State without the necessity of fulfilling 
the resources requirement.  Arguably, this was not envisaged by the EU15 at the time the 
transitional arrangements were drawn up but it would appear that there are no grounds to 
challenge this reading of the law.  First, the Directive contains no statement of derogation to the 
effect that EU8 and EU2 nationals are subject to any different rules as a result of the transitional 
periods.  Secondly, the very precise language adopted in the annexes to the Acts of 
Accession,113 which contain the details of the transitional restrictions, focuses solely on Articles 1-
6 of Regulation 1612/68114 and leaves very little scope for a wider interpretation of the transitional 
arrangements that includes other provisions of Community law.  The restrictions only centre on 
allowing the EU15 to derogate from the provisions that usually require them to provide EU 
nationals with the opportunity to access their labour markets without experiencing discrimination.  
This ability to enter and reside for a period of three months may prove to be extremely useful for 
EU8 and EU2 nationals who wish to seek work in an EU15 state, despite the imposition of 
transitional restrictions, as it essentially provides a short period of grace within which they can 
seek employment.  Once this initial three-month period comes to a close the right of residence for 
more than three months, in Article 7 of the Directive, becomes the operable provision and it is 
here that the various conditions relating to the different categories of migrant can be found.115                 
 
It is clear that those EU8 and EU2 nationals fulfilling the conditions of residence attached to the 
categories of economically inactive migrant are able to rely on the right to free movement in 
                                                 
112 But note the principle of equal treatment does not apply in full during the first three months as Article 24(2) 
provides that Member States are not obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during this period.  It is slightly 
confusing, then, that Article 14(1) specifies that the right to reside for 3 months is dependant on the individual (and 
family members) not becoming an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State 
113 Article 24 of the Act of Accession [2003] O.J. L236/33, para 2, Annexes; Article 23, Act concerning the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania [2005] O.J. L157/203 and the respective annexes: Annex VI, transitional 
measures, Bulgaria [2005] O.J. L157/278; Annex VII, transitional measures, Romania [2005] O.J. L157/311 
114 [1968] O.J. L257/2 
115 Workers and the self-employed have an automatic right to reside (Article 7(1)(a)) that cannot be withdrawn on the 
basis that they are an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State (Article 
14(4)(a)).  Member States can restrict the residence rights of these groups on grounds of public policy, public security 
or public health subject to the details in Articles 27-33 
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Article 18 EC during the transitional periods.  This is a valuable right in itself and, in particular, it 
seems that many young EU8 nationals have taken advantage of their post-accession ability to 
move to the EU15 as students.116  To gain a right of residence under Article 7 of the Directive 
students are required to have comprehensive sickness insurance and must assure the host 
Member State, by means of declaration,117 that they have sufficient resources to avoid becoming 
a burden on the social assistance system.  They must also be enrolled at a public or private 
establishment, accredited or financed by the host Member State, for the principal purpose of 
following a course of study (this includes vocational training).118  Article 7 also confirms the twin 
requirements of sufficient resources and comprehensive sickness insurance continue to apply as 
regards those who aspire to reside on the basis of being financially independent.119  By analogy 
with the conditions of the three residence Directives under the old regime, the requirements now 
enshrined in Directive 2004/38 will be included in the ‘limitations and conditions’ that the Article 18 
EC right is subject to.         
 
In addition to those situations in which an individual complies fully with the requirements in the 
secondary legislation, however, the manner in which the ECJ has interpreted the caveat of 
‘limitations and conditions’ (albeit under the old regime) indicates there may be occasions when 
an EU8 or an EU2 national does not comply with the letter of the law, in respect of having 
sufficient resources and comprehensive sickness insurance, yet is (theoretically at least) entitled 
to rely on a right to reside flowing from Article 18 EC.  To explore this assertion further it is 
necessary to take a further look at the cases of Baumbast and Grzelczyk. 
 
In  Baumbast120 the British immigration authorities refused Mr Baumbast’s application for an 
extension of his residence permit on the grounds that he and his family were not insured for 
emergency medical treatment in the UK and so failed to comply with the requirement of sickness 
insurance in Directive 90/364.  Mr Baumbast, a German national, had originally moved to the UK 
as a worker but later was employed by a German company that required him to work in Asia and 
                                                 
116 For example: in 2004/2005 8,390 Polish students took part in the Erasmus exchange program and 2,200 Polish 
nationals enrolled in British universities (compared to just 965 in 2003/2004). Further, in 2004/2005 Polish nationals 
constituted the second largest group of non-German students in Germany (after Chinese).  Figures cited in Iglicka, K., 
Free Movement of Workers Two Years After Enlargement: Myths and Reality, (Warsaw: Centre for International 
Relations, 2006), 2
117 This was also the position under Directive 93/96 
118 Article 7(1)(c), Directive 2004/38 
119 Article 7(1)(c) 
120 See Dougan and Spaventa, Op. Cit. n.88; Van Der Mei, A.P., ‘Comments on Baumbast’, (2003) 5 European 
Journal of Migration and Law, 419 
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Africa.  His family, however, continued to reside in the UK where they owned a house and the 
children attended school.  Although the Baumbasts did not satisfy the requirement of having 
health insurance in the UK they did have comprehensive medical insurance in Germany, where 
they returned to when they required treatment, and they had never sought to rely on the British 
welfare system.  The UK court sought guidance from the ECJ as to whether Mr Baumbast could 
derive a right of residence from Article 18 EC. 
 
After making the pronouncements, described above, that Article 18 EC was directly effective but 
the Member States were legitimately able to ensure nationals of other Member States did not 
become an unreasonable burden the Court went on discuss further the notion of ‘limitations and 
conditions’.  Most crucially, the Court went on to note that the: 
 
‘limitations and conditions must be applied in compliance with the limits imposed by Community 
law and in accordance with the general principles of that law, in particular with the principle of 
proportionality’.121           
 
Given that the Baumbasts had not been a burden on the UK’s public finances (indeed Mr 
Baumbast had made a positive economic contribution in the past), that the family were well 
integrated after residing in the UK for a number of years, and that insurance was in place in 
another Member State, the Court concluded that: 
 
‘to refuse to allow Mr Baumbast to exercise his right of residence… on the ground that his 
sickness insurance does not cover the emergency treatment given in the host Member State 
would amount to a disproportionate interference with the exercise of that right’.122  
 
Thus by virtue of the application of the principle of proportionality Mr Baumbast’s right of 
residence remained intact despite not complying with the formal requirements of the secondary 
legislation.123
 
                                                 
121 Baumbast, para. 91 
122 Baumbast, para. 93 
123 Dougan and Spaventa, Op. Cit. n.88, 703; Dougan, Op. Cit. n.82, 114 
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The decision in Grzelczyk,124 while preceding the decision in Baumbast, displays a similar line of 
reasoning in relation to the requirement of sufficient resources for students in Directive 93/96.  
Rudy Grzelczyk, a French national, studied in Belgium and in the fourth year of his course he 
applied for the Belgian minimex (a non-contributory minimum subsistence allowance).  By 
applying for such a benefit, of course, he indicated that he did not in fact have sufficient resources 
as stipulated by the Directive.  In his previous years of residence Grzelczyk had worked part time; 
however, as he was in his last year he wished to be able to concentrate just on his academic 
studies.  This case is important also for the discussion of the equal treatment principle but with 
regards to residence the Court stressed that refusal of a residence permit cannot be the 
automatic consequence of recourse to the host Member State’s social assistance system.125  The 
Court placed significance on the fact that Grzelczyk was merely experiencing ‘temporary 
difficulties’ and, as a result, he was entitled to expect to benefit from a degree of financial 
solidarity between nationals of the host Member State and nationals of other Member States.126  
On the basis of these cases, Dougan and Spaventa stress that: 
 
‘Baumbast… illustrates the application of proportionality to the “health insurance” requirement 
imposed by the three Residency Directives.  The earlier case of Grzelcyk illustrates (though more 
in hindsight than in the explicit reasoning of the judgment itself) the application of the principle of 
proportionality to the requirement of “sufficient resources” set out in the Residency Directives’.127        
 
Therefore, this application of the proportionality principle to the exercise of the Member States’ 
discretion may allow the enforcement of a right to reside by an individual who does not actually 
meet the legislative requirements.  Arguably, this remains so following the adoption of Directive 
2004/38.  The proportionality principle is not expressly codified; rather, Article 14(2) states that 
economically inactive migrants retain the right of residence so long as they continue to fulfil the 
conditions attached to that residence (i.e. sufficient resources and sickness insurance).  However, 
the preamble does refer to the importance of migrants not becoming an unreasonable burden on 
the social assistance system of the host Member State128 and this is essentially what the 
                                                 
124 See Dougan and Spaventa, Op. Cit. n.88; Jacqueson, C., ‘Union Citizenship and the Court of Justice: Something 
New Under the Sun? Towards Social Citizenship’, (2002) 27(3) European Law Review, 260; Iliopouou, A. and Toner, 
H., ‘Casenote on Grzelczyk’, (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review, 609 
125 Grzelczyk, para. 43.  This has since been codified in Directive 2004/38, Article 14(3) 
126 Grzelczyk, para. 44 
127 Dougan and Spaventa, Op. Cit. n.88, 703 
128 Recital 10, Preamble, Directive 2004/38 
  - 24 - European Union Studies Association Conference, 17-19 May 2007, Montreal 
application of the principle of proportionality to the twin requirements in the legislation sought to 
achieve.  On the basis of this analysis the stage seems set for the Court to continue to apply 
proportionality to the Member States’ efforts to enforce their limitations and conditions on a right 
of residence, the determining factor remaining whether the individual has become an 
‘unreasonable burden’.129    
 
Of course, by no means is the right of residence for the economically-inactive unlimited but the 
Court’s use of proportionality has injected a greater degree of flexibility into the black-letter 
provisions and allowed it to extend residence (and equal treatment) rights to some individuals that 
fell outside of the formal legislative regime.  Applying this caselaw then to nationals of the CEE 
Member States, during the transitional periods EU8 and EU2 nationals with adequate resources 
can reside a Member State applying restrictions; furthermore, the right is flexible and may not 
automatically be rescinded should they fail to fulfil one of the conditions in the secondary 
legislation.   
 
The application of proportionality, though, clearly cannot assist all those economically inactive 
migrants who experience hardship and fail to fulfil the requirements of residency.  A case which 
demonstrates this is that of Trojani130 where the Member State’s application of limitations and 
conditions was held to be proportionate.  Trojani, a French national, was residing in Belgium in a 
Salvation Army hostel and had made an application to receive the Belgium minimex which had 
been refused by the national authorities.131  In relation to the issue of whether or not Trojani could 
enjoy a right of residence by virtue of the right to free movement in Article 18 EC the ECJ 
confirmed that the requirement of sufficient resources was subject to the principle of 
proportionality.132  However, the Court went on to note that, in Trojani’s case, a lack of resources 
                                                 
129 This concept is not quantified but whether or not an individual constitutes an ‘unreasonable burden’ is often related 
to the application of the equal treatment principle (described below) which extends the right to access various welfare 
benefits to resident Union citizens.  This may result in lawful residence activating the right to equal treatment which, in 
turn, enables the migrant to access social assistance; at this point, the Member State may lawfully conclude the 
claimant is an unreasonable burden and withdraw the right of residence.  See Dougan and Spaventa, Op. Cit. n.88, 
708 
130 Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] E.C.R. I-7573, see further Van Der Mei, A.P., ‘Union Citizenship and the ‘De-
Nationalisation’ of the Territorial Welfare State’, (2005) 7 European Journal of Migration and Law, 203 
131 Note that part of the judgment discusses whether Trojani can be classed as a worker for the purposes of 
Community law, in which case he would have the right to equal treatment as regards social advantages (Article 7(2), 
Regulation 1612/68), as he carried out ‘odd jobs’ for the Salvation Army.  The ECJ, after reiterating the definition of 
worker, ruled it was for the national court to assess whether Trojani fulfilled the criteria (paras. 13-29) 
132 Trojani, para. 34 
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was precisely the reason why Mr Trojani sought to receive a benefit such as the minimex.133  In 
contrast to the situation in Baumbast, then, Trojani could not derive a right to reside from Article 
18 EC because ‘there was no indication that… the failure to recognise that right would go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the objective pursued by… Directive [90/364]’.134  It seems then that 
the application of proportionality would only be useful to those CEE migrants who had previously 
fulfilled the conditions of the Directive, of having sufficient resources and sickness insurance, but 
later fell on hard times that were temporary in nature.135  Baumbast and Grzelzcyk illustrate that 
the Court values those with a greater sense of ‘belonging’ to the host state.136  Article 18 EC is 
unlikely to be of great benefit to those wishing to establish in the first instance residence in 
another Member State.137  Further, despite not fulfilling the requirements in the secondary 
legislation, it is clear that the Baumbasts, in particular, were portrayed as ‘worthy’ beneficiaries of 
the right to reside given their clear financial autonomy and the unlikeliness of the family ever 
requiring social assistance.138  Grzelzcyk, too, is described in terms of having worked hard in the 
past to finance his studies.139  By contrast, those such as Trojani who, as Dougan and Spaventa 
claim, are the more ‘vulnerable members of society’ remain ‘alienated’ from the same right.140     
 
Less-wealthy EU8 and EU2 nationals will find it difficult to establish a right to reside in the EU15 
longer than the initial three-month period of grace granted to all citizens under Directive 2004/38.  
Taking Poland as an example, considering the high rates of unemployment and the low rates of 
pay available in the country,141 alongside the assertion that many wish to move in order to 
increase their wealth, it would appear that certainly many Polish nationals would fall into the 
‘vulnerable’ group unable to enforce a right of residence in an EU15 state on the basis of Article 
18 EC.   
 
Clearly, the fundamental test remains that a economically inactive migrant should not become an 
unreasonable burden.  If this threshold is reached the Member State is entitled to expel the 
                                                 
133 Trojani, para. 35 
134 Trojani, para. 36 
135 As Grzelczyk did 
136 Dougan and Spaventa, Op. Cit. n.88, 712 
137 Van Der Mei, Op. Cit. n.120, 432 
138 Baumbast, paras. 88-89 
139 Grzelczyk, paras. 10-11 
140 Dougan and Spaventa, Op. Cit. n.88, 712 
141 Keune, M., Youth Unemployment in Hungary and Poland: Action Programme on Youth Unemployment, 
International Labour Organisation, Employment and Training Paper 20, Switzerland, 1998 
  - 26 - European Union Studies Association Conference, 17-19 May 2007, Montreal 
individual.  On this note, Dougan raises the example of a further interesting scenario.142  The right 
of a Member State to expel an individual who no longer fulfils the residency requirements is, as 
we know, subject to the application of proportionality and other general principles of Community 
law.143  Dougan suggests there is scope for a CEE accession national, who does not satisfy the 
conditions of residence as either a self-employed person or self-sufficient citizen, to argue that 
expulsion would infringe the right to family and private life under Article 8 of the ECHR.144  The 
Court has certainly demonstrated an increasing tendency to draw inspiration from this particular 
provision.  For example, in Akrich145 the UK’s authorities had taken the decision to expel the 
third-country national spouse of a Community national.146  The ECJ stressed that the UK must 
not violate the Akrichs’ right to respect for family life: 
 
‘Even though the Convention does not as such guarantee the right of an alien to enter or reside in 
a particular country, the removal of a person from a country where close members of his family 
are living may amount to an infringement of the right to respect for family life guaranteed by 
Article 8(1) of the Convention’.147          
 
Dougan argues that this line of argument may prove particularly accessible to those EU8 and 
EU2 migrants who have demonstrated a desire for themselves and their family to integrate into 
the host society: 
 
‘If the claimant has lived in the host state for a significant period of time, perhaps with his/her 
family and children, such that the claimant has few remaining personal ties to the country of 
origin, and the host state has become his/her home for all purposes save nationality, expulsion 
might be held to strike an unfair balance between the legitimate interests of the Member State 
and the private rights of the individual’.148                
 
                                                 
142 Dougan, Op. Cit. n.82, 118-119 
143 Case C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] E.C.R. I-7091 
144 Dougan, Op. Cit. n.82, 118 
145 Case C-109/01 Akrich [2003] E.C.R. I-9607 
146 See also Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] E.C.R. I-6279 which involved the third-country national spouse of a 
British national providing services, pursuant to Article 49 EC, in other Member States.  The ECJ stated that the UK 
decision to expel Mrs Carpenter ran contrary to Mr Carpenter’s right to respect for family life in Article 8 of the ECHR 
which was to be protected in his capacity as service provider (paras. 41-42) 
147 Akrich, para. 59 
148 Dougan, Op. Cit. n.82, 118 
  - 27 - European Union Studies Association Conference, 17-19 May 2007, Montreal 
This analysis is engaging and details another possible way, in addition to the application of 
proportionality, whereby an EU8 or EU2 national could enforce a right to reside in an EU15 
Member State despite the imposition of transitional restrictions.  It is doubtful, however, that this 
will be applied in practice to any great extent.  Research suggests that CEE migrants, certainly 
the majority of EU8 nationals who have moved to the UK after 2004, frequently move alone; 
hence, their family members remain in the home state and, furthermore, the migrants themselves 
retain active transnational links with their home society.149 On this understanding it seems 
unlikely that, at this stage, many CEE nationals and their families will display sufficient degrees of 
integration in a host state to justify the protection of a right to reside by Article 8 of the ECHR.  
Furthermore if an EU8 or EU2 family, despite having moved to an EU15 Member State, could 
integrate back into the home society relatively easily then arguably their expulsion would pass the 
threshold in Article 8(2) of the ECHR of being in ‘accordance with the law and necessary in a 
democratic society’.         
 
This discussion has demonstrated that the right to reside in another Member State is no longer 
based solely on the carrying out of ‘worthwhile’ economic activity by virtue of Article 18 EC.  All 
Union citizens enjoy a directly effective right to reside throughout the Union and, although this is 
subject to the conditions set out in the secondary legislation, the Court has injected some 
flexibility into the operation of these requirements through the application of the principle of 
proportionality (and other general principles of Community law).  Consequently, there may be 
occasions where a claimant fails to fulfil the requirements yet still retains the right to reside.  
Despite the transitional restrictions on their movement rights as workers, then, Article 18 EC may 
well prove valuable for financially-independent EU8 and EU2 nationals seeking to enforce a right 
to reside in the EU15; or, thanks to proportionality, the almost financially-independent.  Article 18 
EC still cannot assist the less wealthy in enforcing a right to reside and, in this respect, will not 
help those who wish to exercise mobility rights in order to better their living standards (and that of 
their families) by working.  Thus, although it is interesting to speculate on the interplay between 
the right to reside as a citizen and the transitional restrictions on workers’ residence entitlement, 
                                                 
149 Currie, S., Free Movement and European Union Enlargement: A Socio-Legal Analysis of the Citizenship Status 
and Experiences of Polish Migrant Workers in the UK, University of Liverpool, 2007 (PhD Thesis); Silver, A., Families 
Across Borders: The Effects of Migration on Family Members Remaining at Home, Paper prepared for the Population 
Association Meeting of America Annual Meeting, March 30-April 1 2006.  Available for download at 
<http://paa2006.princeton.edu/abstractViewer.aspx?submissionId=61355> (last accessed 24 November 2006); 
Iglicka, K., Free Movement of Workers Two Years After Enlargement: Myths and Reality, (Warsaw: Centre for 
International Relations, 2006), 2 
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the practical impact of Article 18 EC on the experience of EU8 and EU2 nationals is unlikely to be 
far-reaching.150
 
In any event, the right to reside under Article 18 EC remains significantly more constrained than 
that which is extended to workers.  Despite the inclusion in Directive 2004/38 of the Grzelczyk 
statement that expulsion should not be the automatic consequence of a citizen’s recourse to the 
social assistance system the host Member State is entitled to conclude, provided the principle of 
proportionality is respected, that the citizen no longer satisfies the conditions of having sufficient 
resources and sickness insurance.  Furthermore, as will be discussed in the following section, 
citizens’ rights to equal treatment are not as extensive or secure as those extended to market 
citizens.      
 
3.2. The interplay between Articles 12 and 18 EC: CEE migrants’ access to the principle of 
non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality 
We know that economically-active market citizens have an extensive right to residency which,151 
in turn, provides an all-encompassing right to equal treatment in the host Member State152 that 
includes within its remit the ability to access a plethora of social welfare benefits.153  Economically 
inactive migrant citizens have not traditionally, under the residency Directives, had such extensive 
rights to equal treatment.154  This section will examine, however, how the Court’s interpretation of 
the citizenship provisions, in combination with Article 12 EC, has enabled lawfully resident, albeit 
economically inactive, citizens to claim a greater stake in the right to equal treatment and, as a 
result, better access to a form of (European) social citizenship.  Again, this is discussed within the 
framework of CEE migration during the transitional periods and the impact of Directive 2004/38 
on the rights of equal treatment available to EU8 and EU2 migrants is examined.     
 
Article 17(2) EC provides that citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty 
and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby.  One such right conferred by the Treaty is that 
                                                 
150 Although the discussion here is restricted to those EU8 and EU2 nationals who are not workers, such as students 
or the financially independent (as compared to Community migrant workers), Dougan puts forward a convincing 
argument about the potential application of Article 18 EC to those EU8 nationals who work illegally but satisfy the 
criterion of being economically active or financially independent, see Dougan, Op. Cit. n.82, 128-132  
151 For example in relation to workers they flow from Article 39 EC and are articulated in Directive 2004/38 (previously 
Directive 68/360 [1968] O.J. L257/13) 
152 Article 24, Directive 2004/38 
153 Article 7(2), Regulation 1612/68.  For example, Cases 249/83 Hoeckx [1985] E.C.R. 973; C-237/94 O’Flynn [1996] 
E.C.R. I-2617 
154 For example, Case 197/86 Brown [1988] E.C.R. 3205 
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contained in Article 12 EC – the right to be protected against discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality.  It was the case of Martinez Sala which first established that citizens lawfully resident 
in a Member State could challenge unequal treatment they experienced, in comparison to 
nationals of the host state, on the basis of Article 12 EC.155  Mrs Martinez Sala, a Spanish 
national, had moved to Germany as a child in 1968.  She had been employed there, in a variety 
of jobs, until 1989 but since then had received social assistance from the city of Nuremberg.  Up 
until 1984, Sala had been granted residence permits but, from then on, she was simply in 
possession of a series of documents certifying that she had applied for an extension to her 
residence permit.  She was, again, issued with a residence permit in 1994 but in 1993 she had 
applied for, and been refused, a child-raising allowance.  Her application was rejected on the 
basis that she did not have German nationality, a residence permit or residence entitlement.  The 
Court, first, held that Sala, as a national of a Member State lawfully residing in the territory of 
another Member State,156 came within the scope ratione personae of the citizenship provisions in 
the Treaty.157  Secondly, the ECJ went on to state that such a Union citizen could benefit from the 
equal treatment principle in Article 12 EC in relation to all matters that fell within the scope ratione 
materiae of the Treaty.158  The child-raising allowance was found to fall ‘indisputably’ within the 
material scope of the Treaty by analogy with the benefits available to workers under Article 7(2) of 
Regulation 1612/68 and those qualifying as ‘family benefits’ under Article 4(1)(h) of Regulation 
1408/71.159      
 
Martinez Sala has had significant implications for the status of Union citizenship and its 
relationship with the principle of non-discrimination.  O’Leary makes the point that: 
 
‘Martinez Sala confirms that Union citizenship explodes the “linkages” with EC law previously 
required for the principle of non-discrimination to apply, namely performance or involvement in an 
economic activity as workers, established persons or providers and recipients of services, 
                                                 
155 Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala [1998] E.C.R. I-2691.  See Tomuschat, C., ‘Comment on Maria Martinez Sala’, 
(2000) 37 Common Market Law Review, 449; O’Leary, S., ‘Putting Flesh on the Bones of European Union 
Citizenship’, (1999) 24(1) European Law Review, 68  
156 On the basis of national law as opposed to Article 18 EC, see below 
157 Martinez Sala, para. 61 
158 Martinez Sala, para. 63 
159 Martinez Sala, para. 57.  Tomuschat is critical of the application of principles developed in relation to economically 
active migrant workers to a non-economically active migrant citizen, Op. Cit. n.155, 452 
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preparation for a future economic activity as a student or stagiaire or some sort of relationship 
with an economic actor as a family member or dependant’.160      
 
Lawful residence is thus the key to establishing a right to equal treatment as a Union citizen and, 
as Dougan and Spaventa point out: 
 
‘Equal treatment not only flows from lawful residency; it also makes the latter status more 
meaningful in practice’.161
 
Grzelczyk demonstrates this point nicely.  We have already seen that Grzelczyk had a right to 
reside in Belgium on the basis of Article 18 EC and therefore he fell within the scope ratione 
personae of the Citizenship provisions.  With regard to the refusal of the Belgian authorities to 
grant him the minimex the Court further held that this amounted to direct discrimination – 
comparable with the discrimination experienced by Martinez Sala - which was strictly prohibited 
by Article 12 EC:162
 
‘It is clear from the documents before the Court that a student of Belgian nationality… who found 
himself in exactly the same circumstances as Mr Grzelczyk would satisfy the conditions for 
obtaining the minimex.  The fact that Mr Grzelczyk is not of Belgian nationality is the only bar to it 
being granted to him.  It is not therefore in dispute that the case is one of discrimination solely on 
the ground of nationality’.163     
 
In relation to the scope ratione materiae, the ECJ in Grzelczyk again drew a parallel with Article 
7(2) of Regulation 1612/68.164  Further, the Court stated that, simply through students’ movement 
and residence in another Member State, provisions of Community law relating to them fall within 
                                                 
160 O’Leary, Op. Cit. n.155, 77 
161 Dougan and Spaventa, Op. Cit. n.88, 708 
162 Indirect discrimination is discussed more specifically below in relation to the status of workseekers in the UK but, 
for now, it is sufficient to note that the Court does adopt a different approach when dealing with a national measure 
that is indirectly discriminatory on the grounds of nationality.  Indirect discrimination can be justified by reference to 
objective justification under the doctrine of mandatory requirements.  In particular, it appears that a Member State is 
entitled to require that an individual demonstrate a genuine link to the national territory before he/she is able to claim 
equal treatment as regards to welfare benefits: Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] E.C.R. I-2119; Case C-224/98 D’Hoop 
[2002] E.C.R. I-6191; Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] E.C.R. I-2703; Case C-258/04 Ioannidis [2005] E.C.R. I-8275  
163 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] E.C.R. I-6193, para. 29 
164 Grzelczyk, para. 27 
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the material scope.165  The ECJ was of the opinion that the introduction in the EC Treaty of the 
citizenship provisions and a chapter on education and vocational training,166 alongside the 
existence of the Students’ Residence Directive 93/96, had altered the position of Community law.   
In the earlier case of Brown167 it had been decided that, at the stage of development Community 
law was at, there was no anti-discrimination protection available in the area of maintenance or 
training grants.168  Following Grzekczyk, then, Brown  is no longer regarded as a correct 
statement of the law169 and the elevated status of students as Union citizens means that the 
equal treatment principle can apply as regards social security and assistance benefits available to 
students under national law.   
 
Migrating as a student may be an attractive option to EU8 and EU2 nationals during the operation 
of the transitional arrangements on the free movement of workers.  Furthermore, moving as a 
student may hold out the possibility of entering to reside via the ‘back door’ as there is somewhat 
of a grey area surrounding the right of CEE students to access part time work in a Member State 
applying transitional restrictions.  Students usually are allowed access to the labour market on the 
basis of the principle of non-discrimination but the position as regards EU8 and EU2 migrant 
students in Member States applying transitional restrictions is more ambiguous; arguably, under 
the terms of the Accession Treaties, Member States are lawfully able to prevent labour market 
access by this group.  Surely it will be in a Member State’s interest to allow (genuine) students to 
access part time employment on their territory, although fears of bogus students using the status 
as a cover for labour market access may persuade Member States that it is safer to deny access.  
The UK requires EU8 students to fulfil the registration requirements of the Worker Registration 
Scheme in order for their employment activity to be considered lawful.170  In any event, the ability 
to move as a student may tempt some with the notion that labour market access will follow.  In 
addition to this perceived attractiveness of moving as a student, however, the legal status is 
potentially quite a far-reaching one,171 although the impact of Directive 2004/38 does need to be 
considered in this respect.   
   
                                                 
165 Grzelczyk, para. 35 
166 Title XI, Chapter 3 of Part three of the EC Treaty  
167 Case 197/86 Brown [1988] E.C.R. 3205 
168 Although pre-Brown, in Case 293/83 Gravier [1985] E.C.R. 593, the ECJ had held that there was a right to equal 
treatment in relation to fees for Higher Education 
169 Grzelczyk, paras. 34-35 
170 Thus subjecting them to a £70 fee 
171 See further Dougan, M., ‘Fees, Grants, Loans and Dole Cheques: Who Covers the Costs of Migrant Education in 
the EU?’, (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review, 943  
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Following Grzelczyk, the extent of students’ equal treatment rights was considered further in 
Bidar.172  Mr Bidar, a French national, had resided in and been enrolled at a secondary school in 
the UK for three years before he entered university there.  Whilst he was charged the same 
tuition fee rate as national students he was denied financial assistance to cover his maintenance 
costs in the form of a student loan.  First, Bidar was clearly entitled to a right of residence in the 
UK under Article 18 EC read in conjunction with the general residence Directive 90/364 (not the 
Students’ Directive) the conditions of which he satisfied.173  As a result of his lawful residence 
Bidar was entitled to equal treatment as regards social assistance benefits (as in Grzelczyk) but 
the issue then was whether those benefits included assistance for maintenance costs through 
subsidised loans or grants.  Once again the Court referred to the developments in Community law 
cited in Grzelczyk174 before confirming that social assistance: 
 
‘whether in the form of subsidised loans or of grants, provided to students lawfully resident in the 
host Member State to cover their maintenance costs falls within the scope of application of the 
Treaty for the purposes of the prohibition of discrimination laid down in the first paragraph of 
Article 12 EC’.175        
 
This ruling, therefore, fortified the citizenship status of migrant students by confirming that 
developments in Community law had extended the scope of benefits they could access by virtue 
of the equal treatment principle.  Despite this extension in the scope of equal treatment rights 
available to students the reasoning of the Court suggests it will be by no means easy for EU8 (or 
EU2) nationals who move during the transitional period to benefit from such equal treatment in 
relation to student loans (and grants).  As the UK legislation at issue imposed a requirement of 
three years prior residency before a student could claim a loan it did not overtly discriminate 
directly on the ground of nationality; instead, the requirement was intrinsically liable to impact on 
more non-nationals than nationals and, hence, amounted to indirect discrimination.  Thus, the 
ECJ confirmed that Member States can legitimately expect the individuals in question to display a 
degree of integration into the host society before granting them access to assistance covering the 
maintenance costs of students.176  Therefore, CEE nationals residing lawfully in the territory of an 
                                                 
172 Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] E.C.R. I-2119, see Barnard, C., ‘Comment on Bidar’, (2005) 42 Common Market Law 
Review, 1465 
173 Bidar, para. 36 
174 Bidar, para. 39 
175 Bidar, para. 48 
176 Bidar, para. 57 
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EU Member State during the transitional periods would have to demonstrate a sufficient degree of 
integration and prior-residency before being able to access the type of benefits in Bidar.  This is 
quite a high hurdle to overcome and, in effect, requires the migrant to reside in the host Member 
State for a significant period prior to the enrolment on a course.  Thus, it is unlikely to assist those 
who moved from the EU8 to the EU15 after 1 May 2004 to study (or those who moved from the 
EU2 after 1 January 2007) as they have not built up any residence, and hence rights to 
solidarity,177 within that territory.  Bidar himself did not gain access to the right of equal treatment 
by virtue solely of the status of migrant student.  He had not moved in order to study; rather, his 
access to university stemmed from a long-term residence in the UK which he fulfilled as a 
financially independent person (he had lived with his grandmother, as her dependant).  The 
circumstances were somewhat exceptional.  In addition, even though the Court in Bidar spoke in 
terms of student ‘grants and loans’ this was in the context of Directive 90/364 not Directive 93/96 
which specifically excluded maintenance grants from the scope of equal treatment.178      
 
Those CEE students who are integrated to a sufficiently high extent, perhaps by having gained 
entry prior to the enlargement, will probably be entitled to protection against discrimination in the 
area of maintenance loans or grants for students by analogy with Bidar.  Furthermore, it should 
be remembered that those legally residing in a Member State for a year prior to accession are not 
subject to transitional mobility restrictions.  This group, then, is privileged as compared to those 
CEE nationals who moved after the date of accession.  In any event, this discussion may be 
slightly superfluous following the entry into force of the citizenship Directive in 2006.  Directive 
2004/38 appears to step back from the decision in Bidar and, on a literal interpretation, provides 
that both maintenance grants and loans are excluded from the principle of equal treatment in 
Article 24 until the individual claiming entitlement has lawfully resided in the territory for five years 
and is, consequently, a permanent resident under Article 16 of the Directive.179  To an extent this 
can be seen as a codification of the Court’s stance in Bidar that an individual should be able to 
display a sufficient degree of integration into the host society, though five years is clearly a 
harsher test of integration than the three years specified in Bidar.   
 
                                                 
177 Barnard, C., ‘EU Citizenship and the Principle of Solidarity’ in Dougan, M. and Spaventa, E. (Eds.), Social Welfare 
and EU Law, (Oxford: Hart, 2005), 157 
178 Article 3, Directive 93/96.  Therefore the status of maintenance grants and loans, as opposed to general social 
assistance, under Directive 93/96 was unclear.  For further analysis of the impact of Bidar (and Grzekczyk) on the 
exclusion in Directive 93/96, see Dougan, Op. Cit. n.171 and Barnard, Op. Cit. n.172     
179 Article 24(2), Directive 2004/38.   
  - 34 - European Union Studies Association Conference, 17-19 May 2007, Montreal 
Some commentators180 expect that the Court will continue to apply the Baumbast-style principle 
of proportionality to the terms of the new Directive so the five year threshold may not have to be 
met in all circumstances in order for the equal treatment principle to be activated in respect of 
maintenance grants and loans.181  Hailbronner, for example, makes reference to the Court’s 
application of proportionality to the requirements in Directives 90/364 and 93/96 and suggests 
that: 
 
‘The principle of proportionality, devoid of any precise content if not applied restrictively and its 
proper systematic context, may again serve as an almost unlimited instrument to amend 
secondary Community law’.182             
 
It would seem that at the point of five years residence the right to equal treatment accrues de jure, 
regardless of the level of actual integration.  Prior to this point, the de facto degree of integration 
can be examined (via a test of proportionality) and may be held sufficient to invoke the equal 
treatment principle.  Therefore, the notion of proportionality may be used again by the Court to 
justify a departure from the strict letter of the law.  Given the emphasis in the caselaw, however, 
on the importance of integration as a key to unlocking the right to solidarity183 it is likely to remain 
the case that those who show insufficient levels of integration into a host state, and/or have 
resided only for a short period of time, will not be able to claim student maintenance grants or 
loans even with the principle of proportionality being applied to the new legislative regime.  Post-
accession EU8 and EU2 migrants thus are likely to be excluded from this right.  There is a 
developing consensus in the literature that residence, as a symbol of integration, is not only the 
key to equal treatment but also the differentiator which determines the extent of the application of 
equal treatment to any one individual.184  With this in mind Dougan argues that: 
 
                                                 
180 Dougan, M., Op. Cit. n.171, 969, see also Hailbronner, Op. Cit. n.99, 1264; Dougan, M. and Spaventa, E., ‘‘Wish 
You Weren’t Here…’ New Models of Social Solidarity in the European Union’ in Dougan, M. and Spaventa, E. (Eds.), 
Social Welfare and EU Law, (Oxford: Hart, 2005), 181; Dougan, M., ‘The Constitutional Dimension to the Case Law 
on Union Citizenship’, (2006) 5 European Law Review, 613, 627-633 
181 Note also that similar considerations are relevant to workseekers.  The Directive appears to step back from 
decisions such as Case C-138/02 Collins [2004] E.C.R. I-2703 in relation to workseekers’ equal treatment rights as 
Article 24(2) similarly states that the host Member State is not obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during 
the first three months of residence, or during the extended period of residence where the workseeker provides 
evidence that he or she is continuing to seek employment and has genuine chances of being engaged. 
182 Hailbronner, Op. Cit. n.99, 1264 
183 Most notably Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] E.C.R. I-2119 and Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] E.C.R. I-7573 
184 In particular, Dougan and Spaventa, Op. Cit. n.180; Barnard, Op. Cit. n.177; Golynker, O., Ubiquitous Citizens of 
Europe: The Paradigm of Partial Migration, (Oxford: Intersentia, 2006) 
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‘It might still emerge from the caselaw itself that new or very recent arrivals cannot challenge 
apparently discriminatory restrictions on access to welfare benefits because they are not in fact in 
a comparable situation to own nationals or other Union citizens who have actually resided in the 
host state’.185  
 
From this perspective new arrivals are entitled to equal treatment as regards access to certain 
advantages in the host Member State186 but often will not be able to rely on the principle with 
regard to social welfare benefits.  Barnard describes the situation, in terms of solidarity, as such: 
 
‘While Article 18(1) EC gives newly arrived migrants the right to move and reside freely in the host 
state there is insufficient solidarity between the newly arrived migrant and the host state taxpayer 
to justify requiring full equal treatment in respect of social welfare benefits’.187  
 
This tendency of the Court, to use previous periods of residence as a means to measure the 
degree to which an individual citizen can access equal treatment, clearly has implications beyond 
students as a category of migrant as it applies also in the realm of financially independent 
persons and workseekers.  The transitional arrangements, although applicable only to workers 
and restricted to the equal treatment rights contained in the provisions granting labour market 
access, may have an indirect impact on the longer-term ability of EU nationals in general to 
benefit from the non-discrimination right in Article 12 EC.  By denying CEE nationals the right to 
reside in a territory to take up employment the Accession Treaties are denying them the ability to 
employ one of the main methods citizens have used to build up entitlement to equal treatment - 
integration into a society.188  Moreover, the Court’s reliance on residence as the main indicator of 
integration is by no means immune from criticism.  For example, it may be that EU8 and EU2 
nationals who have taken up work in an EU15 Member State since accession, despite only 
having resided there themselves for a short period, have strong family ties to that host state.        
 
                                                 
185 Dougan, M., Op. Cit. n.171, 969, on this comparability model see Dougan and Spaventa, Op. Cit. n.180 
186 Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] E.C.R. I-7637 (the right to have criminal proceedings conducted in the 
citizen’s mother tongue);  Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] E.C.R. I-11613 (the right of the children of a Union 
citizen to take their mother’s surname where the national law of the host state specified it had to be the father’s 
surname)   
187 Barnard, Op.Cit. n.172, 172 
188 Both Martinez Sala and Grzelczyk had been employed in the respective host Member States, a point that did not 
go unnoticed by the Court 
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EU8 and EU2 migrants who are (almost) financially independent and are lawfully residing in an 
EU Member State will have access to the principle of equal treatment in Article 12 EC.  It would 
seem that the longer they have resided lawfully - and the extent to which they demonstrate 
assimilation into the host society - the more far-reaching this right will be.  In particular, social 
benefits may require a high level of integration and, as we know, this may be difficult for post-
accession CEE migrants to attain currently.  EU15 Member States troubled by the obligation to 
extend equal treatment rights to EU8 and EU2 nationals may come to the conclusion that it is 
mutually beneficial for such individuals to work during the transitional period.  In this scenario the 
Member State benefits from the economic contribution of the taxpaying worker and the individual 
gains the more secure status of Community worker with a more protected equal treatment 
entitlement.  In any event, those EU8 and EU2 nationals that do obtain access to social benefits 
on the basis of their lawful residence may find themselves particularly at risk of losing their right of 
residence.  It is only ‘a certain degree of financial solidarity’ that Member States must show to 
nationals of other Member States189 and a host Member State remains entitled to take steps to 
prevent nationals from other Member States becoming an unreasonable burden on the social 
assistance system.190  This illustrates the link between the notions of lawful residence, discussed 
above, and equal treatment: 
 
‘Lawful residency entitles them to equal treatment within the host territory; but exercise of that 
right to equal treatment might, depending on the circumstances, enable the Member State to 
consider that the claimant has become an unreasonable financial burden’.191         
 
When assessing whether an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State exists the Court has, so far, adopted a very individualistic approach, applying the 
principle of proportionality to the particular circumstances of the claimant at issue.192  T h i s  
approach has been criticised by Hailbronner as being too narrow: 
 
                                                 
189 Bidar, para. 56 
190 Though expulsion cannot be an automatic consequence of recourse to social assistance, Grzelczyk, para. 43; 
Article 14(3), Directive 2004/38 
191 Dougan and Spaventa, Op. Cit. n.88, 708 
192 Case C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] E.C.R. I-7091; Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] E.C.R. I-6193 
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‘In any individual case it will hardly ever be possible to show the unreasonableness of a burden.  
The social system as such cannot be substantially affected by one additional beneficiary’.193   
 
Up until this point the potential cumulative effect of a number of similar cases, in Grzelczyk’s 
position for example, has not been considered within the confines of the unreasonable burden 
test.194  The 2004 and 2007 enlargements may present the Court with the opportunity to 
incorporate such an element into to its reasoning, should it wish to and should the chance arise, 
as ‘eastern enlargement clearly has greater cumulative  implications for the existing Member 
States than they believed they had assumed’.195  The transitional restrictions were adopted, 
partly, to prevent the Member States from having to deal with (potential) claims for social benefits 
by (presumably low-paid) CEE migrant workers.  Thus, the Member States are likely to be equally 
concerned about the potential impact of a large number of claims on the basis of Article 12 EC by 
(almost) financially independent EU8 and EU2 citizens; conceivably, the transitional 
arrangements actually encourage reliance on this right thus increasing the potential cumulative 
impact.  Therefore, should a situation come before the Court involving an EU8 or EU2 national in 
a position similar to that of Baumbast or Grzelczyk, the Court may adopt a wider approach to the 
consideration of whether there is a threat of an unreasonable burden being imposed on the 
Member State’s social welfare system and reach a different conclusion as to the proportionality of 
denying access to such benefits.          
 
One issue not yet mentioned, which relates back to the Trojani case, is the possibility for migrants 
who cannot benefit from a right to reside by virtue of Article 18 EC to derive such a right from the 
national law of the host Member State and then claim resultant access to the equal treatment 
principle.  Trojani, the Court held, despite not fulfilling the conditions of Directive 90/364 appeared 
to be lawfully residing on the basis of Belgian national law as he had been issued with a 
residence permit.196  The right not to be discriminated against attaches to those lawfully resident 
as a matter of either Community law, such as Grzelczyk, or national law, such as Trojani.197  
                                                 
193 Hailbronner, Op. Cit. n.99, 1261 
194 Dougan and Spaventa, Op. Cit. n.88, 707 
195 Dougan, Op. Cit. n.82, 117 
196 Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] E.C.R. I-7573, para. 37.  The claimant in Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala [1998] E.C.R. 
I-2691 also derived her right to reside from the national law of the host state.  On Sala see Fries and Shaw, Op. Cit. 
n.82 
197 Trojani, para. 39 
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However, as Van Der Mei acknowledges, this residence under national law is at the discretion of 
the Member State: 
 
‘The ECJ merely said that if Belgium, for whatever reasons, decided to award Mr Trojani lawful 
residence status, it must also treat him equally as Belgian nationals’.198    
 
A Member State in this situation is by no means obliged to continue to grant a right of residence 
to such an individual who does not meet the requirements of sufficient resources and sickness 
insurance.199  This particular method of gaining access to the equal treatment principle is highly 
unlikely to be a viable option for EU8 or EU2 nationals during the time that the transitional 
arrangements are in force.  During this period the national law of the EU15 is likely to offer very 
limited opportunities for CEE nationals to establish any form of residence.       
 
The discussion here has demonstrated how the citizenship provisions provided the Court with the 
foundations to develop the citizenship status of economically inactive migrants by reinforcing the 
rights of residence and equal treatment available to them.  In order to achieve this, the Court has 
relied on certain notions, such as ‘proportionality’, ‘unreasonable burden’ and ‘financial solidarity’ 
which have informed the application of the citizenship provisions.  These concepts are ubiquitous 
in the Court’s judgments on citizenship yet their actual meanings are not entirely clear and they 
largely remain undefined.200  This may be particularly true for ‘financial solidarity’ which is 
historically contingent.  Its meaning depends on the Member State under consideration (place) 
and the particular point in time.  ‘Proportionality’ and ‘unreasonable burden’ encompass 
standards which will inevitably be heavily dependent on context rather than rules.  As a 
consequence of the vague nature of these notions the Court has been able to maintain a degree 
of flexibility in the development and application of citizenship.   
 
Certainly, the Court’s interpretation of, and reliance on, these concepts has resulted in non-
market migrant citizens enjoying greater access to a form of European social citizenship.   
Valuable though these mobility rights flowing from Articles 18 and 12 EC are, the distinction 
                                                 
198 Van Der Mei, Op. Cit. n.130, 210 
199 Trojani, para. 45 
200 For example, ‘unreasonable burden’ has never been quantified.  As a general principle of Community law, 
however, the meaning of proportionality as a concept is clearer: Article 5(3) EC; Case C-331/88 ex parte Fedesa 
[1994] E.C.R. I-48663; Case 181/84 ex parte Man [1985] 2889   
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between economically active market citizens and the economically inactive remains very much 
alive and the difference in each group’s access to the equal treatment principle reaffirms this 
distinction.  EU8 and EU2 nationals’ inability to access the status of worker in the Member States 
imposing transitional restrictions clearly places them in a disadvantageous position, although in 
some circumstances this may be tempered by their ability to move under Article 18 EC (and 
perhaps claim equal treatment rights on this basis).  There is greater potential for EU8 and EU2 
migrants to enhance their citizenship potential, or shift between the different (multiple)201 
citizenship statuses (from student to worker for example), than was available to those subject to 
transitional restrictions after previous enlargements.   The Court’s reliance on the notion of 
integration (on the basis of residence), however, is likely to be a major obstacle to access of the 
equal treatment principle in respect of social welfare benefits.        
 
Conclusion 
Drawing on the established caselaw and literature on the notion of Union citizenship this paper 
has attempted to incorporate the enlargement process into the discussion, and chart some 
aspects of the relationship between the developing citizenship acquis and the transitional mobility 
restrictions.  The symbolic notion of EU enlargement creating a United Europe, unifying nations 
which once stood on opposite sides of the Cold War divide, has been weakened by the existence 
of transitional measures that grant Union citizens different access to the right of free movement 
as a worker on the basis of nationality.  From an equality perspective, particularly given the 
significance of the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality in Community law, 
transitional arrangements are difficult to justify.     
  
The discussion of Union citizenship here, and its application to nationals of the CEE Member 
States, would support the assertion put forward by Kofman that membership of the citizenship 
community is ‘messy’ in practice.202  Everson argues that the European market citizen is the ‘role 
which nationals of the Member States have been expected to play’ to help achieve the ‘legal and 
practical realisation of the internal market’.203  This is not the role assigned to EU8 and EU2 
nationals, at least in the initial phase of their formal membership of the Union.  Instead they are 
expected to forgo participation in EU15 labour markets to ease the fears of the EU15.  Ironically, 
                                                 
201 See Kostakopoulou (2001), Op. Cit. n.92; Kostakopoulou (1999) Op. Cit. n.92; Kostakopoulou, D., ‘Ideas, Norms 
and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change’, (2005) 68(2) Modern Law Review, 233, 234 
202 Kofman, Op. Cit. n.7, 122 
203 Everson, Op. Cit. n.24, 85 
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although EU8 and EU2 nationals do not have full access to the status of European market citizen 
by virtue of the transitional mobility restrictions this is tempered, to some limited extent, by their 
ability to move simply as Union citizens whose citizenship status has been fortified in recent years 
and, in some circumstances, can itself allow access to the equal treatment principle and bestow 
some aspects of solidarity.  There is a further (cruel) irony, however, in that, as the EU is moving 
away from a citizenship conception construed only in economic terms, and when EU8 and EU2 
nationals can rely on the status of non-economically active Union citizen, the status they appear 
to most desire, that of active market citizen, is not accessible to them.  
 
Finally, it should not be forgotten that citizenship of the Union, in the sense of the formal 
provisions, was introduced to increase the EU’s legitimacy and bring Europe ‘closer to its citizens’ 
but the very existence of transitional arrangements on free movement suggests that Europe does 
not desire to be close to all of its citizens – or, at least not as close to some as it is to others.  
After all, it is predominantly through exercising rights of mobility that Member State nationals 
experience meaningful citizenship.  As a consequence of this selective intimacy, the legitimacy of 
the EU in the eyes of some of its newest citizens may be damaged irrevocably as a result of 
transitional mobility restrictions. 
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